Introduction
Social choice theory is concerned with the question of how a group of agents can decide as a collective in a way that reflects their individual opinions. The rich history of the subject can be traced back more than two centuries, but the field picked up steam in the 1950's, when Kenneth Arrow proved a striking result, viz., that it is impossible to aggregate rational preference relations into a collective-"social"-rational preference relation by a mathematical procedure that satisfies certain natural desiderata [2] . Many similar results followed.
Much recent work on social choice theory has revolved around judgement aggregation. 1 This literature is concerned with the problem of aggregating a collection of sentences in a formal logical language, in a logically consistent way, and by a method reflecting the individual views of a group of agents as much as possible. In some sense the story of judgement aggregation appears as a case of history repeating. Judgement aggregation can be regarded as a generalisation of preference aggregation, and it is by now well established that virtually all results on preference aggregation have their counterparts in this newer context. The interest in judgement aggregation was spawned initially by the discovery of an Arrow style impossibility result (List and Pettit [16] ).
Yet there are several advantages of judgement aggregation over preference aggregation that justify the renewed interest. First, by investigating the boundaries of collective reasoning using logic, judgement aggregation elevates the theory of social choice to a higher level of abstraction as well as to a broader, perhaps more natural, conceptualisation of the "rationality of the collective" than the focus on preference relations stemming from economics. Second, judgement aggregation explicitly connects social choice theory to logic. A more implicit link between social choice theory and logic has always been present-on occasions Kenneth Arrow has recounted that his interest in applying axiomatic methods to social choice had sprung from exposure to the mathematics of Gödel and Tarski (see Suppes [26] ). But the new context has inspired logicians to investigate higher-order questions about social choice by applying the formal methods available to them.
This article develops both points in detail. First, collective rationality revolves around the possibility of retaining logical coherence at the level of collective judgements. We will investigate what logical inference rules may be valid at this collective level, and under which conditions. This is done using Pauly's [20] majority logic, which expresses the "collective acceptance" of logical propositions. We show that the validity of inference rules may be viewed as a logical analogue of the axiomatisations known from social choice theory. Indeed, inference rules are just like axioms in that they express behavioural properties of decision procedures. Second, we answer questions about the limitations of these kinds of axiomatisations. Concretely, we give an exact characterisation of the expressive power of majority logic that shows the kind of behavioural properties of decision procedures that can be expressed by it.
What insights follow from this approach, and why should it be of interest to social choice theorists and/or logicians? From the perspective of the social choice theorist, studying a logical language that expresses familiar axioms reveals more structural facts about these axioms. For instance, we prove that any axiom system that can be expressed in majority logic cannot express non-dictatorship; in effect a language-relative "impossibility theorem". This result suggests that the expressive power of majority logic is weak. However, that does not make majority logic irrelevant. A striking number of the traditional axioms of social choice theory can be reformulated in majority logic. We give a characterisation of the classes of decision procedures that may be axiomatised using the language of majority logic, and show that many classes that appear in the social choice literature are axiomatisable in the language. Much of social choice theory is occupied with finding procedures for valid collective inference (or with showing that this is impossible), and this is exactly the domain of majority logic. Since the expressive power of majority logic is crude, impossibility results easily obtain.
From the logician's perspective, logics of decision procedures are simply interesting objects of study. Pauly's majority logic is a minimalistic, modal-flavoured logical language of collective decision making. There are some articles studying social choice theory, particularly preference aggregation, using more expressive languages: Rubinstein [22] proves that a social welfare function is neutral if and only if it is first order definable. Ågnotes et al. [1] use a second order modal logic to express all of Arrow's original axioms and formally deduce his theorem within the logic. This article delineates the expressive power of majority logic, indicating how the minimalistic majority logic sits in the hierarchy of expressive power of logical languages, especially relative to the (basic) modal language. This fits in the research agenda set forth by Pauly [20] , who argues that theorists should pay greater attention to the role of logical languages in social choice theory, in particular to the issue of logical strength of the language needed to express certain axioms.
More complex languages will obviously have more expressive power, but have drawbacks in other respects that worry formalists.
2 Majority logic strikes a balance between simplicity and relevance for understanding social choice theory, and this combination makes it an interesting member of the hierarchy of logical strength. Moreover, its kinship with the well-understood and ubiquitous modal language allows us to use methods at the intersection of three fields: logic, game theory, and social choice theory. An important secondary goal of this article is to highlight how these different fields interact and give rise to systematic results.
To emphasise the links between the three fields, the article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the logical language of majority logic. Truth conditions of sentences in a logical language are always relative to the structures, or "models", it talks about. We introduce collective decisions that are made through a formal decision procedure as the "models" for majority logic. Thus, decision procedures provide the formal semantics to interpret majority logic, and we will see that, conversely, the language of majority logic provides a mathematical handle to express properties of these decision procedures. The whole article revolves around this explicit link between social choice theory and logic.
Section 3 shows that many of the decision procedures that form the basis of these semantics can be represented as "simple games". Logicians usually swiftly recognise that familiar algebraic structures such as filters and ultrafilters are at the core of many impossibility results, and simple games are the set-theoretic structures that make this observation precise. The importance of simple games to understanding results in social choice theory has been stressed by e.g. Monjardet [17] and more recently by Dietrich and List [9] . Simple games also constitute a link between majority logic and monotonic modal logic, where they also appear as a semantical tool. Since both modal logic and simple games have been studied extensively, we can apply many tools from modal logic and game theory to answer questions about the expressive power of majority logic. This approach leads up to our main results on properties of decision procedures that are axiomatisable using majority logic. As indicated, there is a link between these kinds of axiomatisations and the validity of logical inference rules at the collective level. This is discussed in more detail in section 4.
To understand the gist of the main results in this article it suffices to appreciate that the language of majority logic is a syntactic and semantic fragment of the basic modal language. Section 5 discusses this relation between modal logic and majority in more detail, assuming some familiarity with monotonic modal logic. Hansen [13] gives a thorough introduction. The use of the machinery of simple games and the basic modal language comes at a price in generality, since these fields are traditionally studied under monotonicity restrictions. This means that, to keep the use of modal logic and simple games straightforward, this article restricts attention mostly to decision procedures that are monotonic, systematic, and have universal domain. Many decision rules satisfy these properties, including many that are studied in the literature on impossibility theorems. We will briefly return to the significance of these restrictions in the conclusion.
Social Choice Theory Meets Logic
2.1. Introducing the Majority Logic. The impossibility results in social choice theory tell us that logical consistency is too much too demand of collective judgements. But still, collective opinions obey certain logical rules. Consider, for instance, decisions made by majority voting. Suppose that among a group of agents there is a majority in favour of a proposition ϕ. Furthermore assume that ϕ implies ψ. If the opinions of the individual agents are logically consistent, we may infer that there must also be a majority in favour of ψ. Thus, whenever agents collectively decide that ϕ holds, they will also decide that ψ holds. Majority logic, introduced by Pauly [20] , allows us to express this and other formal rules that govern the logic of collective opinions. The language of majority logic, L , is grammatically generated by:
with α a formula of propositional logic.
The interpretation of a formula of the form ψ is that "ψ is collectively accepted". We may now express our observation on the collective logical rules that govern majority voting as follows: from ϕ → ψ we may infer ϕ → ψ. Other kinds of inferences, similar in style, are not valid under majority voting. For instance, from the falsity ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ we cannot infer that ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ must be false. In this case, the operator shields the logic of group decisions from the (possibly logically inconsistent) outcome of the decision procedure.
The operator gives the language of a majority logic a flavour of modal logic. But L is not a modal language. Syntactically, the language of majority logic is a proper fragment of the basic modal language L . Recall that the basic modal language is grammatically generated by:
Comparing L and L , we see that L is the fragment of L that contains no (iterated) modalities and also no boxless formulae. The fragmentary similarity of syntax between majority logic and modal logic has an analogue at the semantic level. Some of the structures that logicians use to interpret L can be used to interpret L , and we can use this to deduce many results about the latter language. This article makes extensive use of this link. But in this section, we first show how to interpret the language L using the most "natural" semantics, that is, using decision procedures.
Social Aggregation Functions.
The first task is to define the idea of a decision procedure more concretely. Let N be a set of agents. It is natural to assume that N is a finite set, but for most results in this article it is not necessary (and whenever we assume this we will state it explicitly). These agents decide on propositions that are sentences of classical propositional logic. Thus, they decide on formulae that are constructed from ⊥, sentence letters q 1 , q 2 , . . . , and the logical connectives ∧, ¬. We fix a countably infinite set of sentence letters Q. The set of all well-formed propositional formulae over this set is denoted L c . By |= we denote the standard propositional entailment relation; Φ |= ψ means ψ follows from Φ (where Φ is either a single formula or a set of formulae in the language L c ), and |= ϕ means ϕ is a tautology. Given Q ⊆ Q, let Q denote the set of literals derived from Q:
Agents' opinions on Q are given by profiles. A profile is a function π : N → P(Q). Π N is the set of all possible profiles for a fixed set of agents N . Intuitively π(i)-a subset of Q-provides the information on the opinion of agent i: she accepts the literals π(i). The set of all agents that accept
where F (π) denotes the socially accepted sentences of L c given the profile π. A procedure F is finitary if it aggregates the opinions of finitely many agents-in other 3 We follow the standard conventions for bracketing and use the abbreviations →, ↔, ∨, . The following terminology, familiar from the social choice literature, expresses some properties that F may have: Definition 1. Fix N , and let π, π ∈ Π N and ϕ, ψ ∈ L c be arbitrary. A decision procedure
In this article, we will assume that decision procedures satisfy UD and S. We will call such decision procedures social aggregation functions ("SAFs"), because they are systematic methods to aggregate the individual opinions of agents, just like majority voting. We will also often assume that SAFs satisfy M (but if so, we will state it explicitly). We have more to say about this particular axiom, and its relation to the logical rules that govern collective decision-making, in subsection 2.4.
2.3. Semantics. Given a particular aggregation procedure, there is a natural way to interpret whether a formula "holds" at the social level: if it is collectively accepted by a group of agents according to this decision procedure. This idea leads to the following formal semantics to evaluate the truth of L -formulae.
Definition 2.
Let F be a decision procedure, and π a profile in the domain of F . The pair (F, π) is called a model. Let ϕ ∈ L c and ψ, ψ 1 , ψ 2 ∈ L . We write:
and (F, π) ⊥ never.
If (F, π) ϕ, we say that ϕ is true in, or satisfied on, the model (F, π).
The language of majority logic was introduced in Pauly [20] , but readers familiar with that article should be warned that Pauly's semantics differ in important details. We briefly dwell on the differences. In Pauly's work, a model for the language L is a simply valuation map V : L → {0, 1}. This map assigns a truth value to each and every formulae of L . In other words, a model is determined by specifying a subset of L , namely precisely those formulae that are true given the valuation V . This set may be regarded as the outcome of some decision procedure in which the group N decide collectively on the truth or falsehood of each sentence in L c , but says nothing about the procedure that has been used to reach this outcome. In sum, Pauly's models abstract from the above interpretation that the truth values of L formulae arise through a social decision procedure. Therefore, in this article we augment the approach adopted by Pauly by explicitly factoring these decision procedures into the analysis. This allows us to link up the business of logicians more closely with that of social choice theorists, who are interested precisely in these underlying decision procedures.
Axiomatising SAFs.
When logicians think of axiomatising a class of structures by a class of sentences, they usually have models and a specific logical language in mind. In terms of the language L this amounts to the following idea. Let M be a class of L -models and let S be a theory (a set of formulae) in the language L . A logician would say that S axiomatises M if and only if M is precisely the class of all L -models that make S true, that is (F, π) ∈ M if and only if (F, π) ϕ for all ϕ ∈ S. In this case S uniquely determines M. Each model (F, π) ∈ M combines "contingent" information, in the form of the opinions of the individual agents described by the profile π, and structural properties of the aggregation procedure F , in order to make each sentence of S true. This is a natural consequence of the above semantics.
Social choice theorists speak of axiomatisations when they provide a collection of properties that characterise a class of aggregation procedures. A social choice theorist would say that a collection of axioms A axiomatises a class K of SAFs if F ∈ K if and only if F satisfies all axioms in A. Usually, the social choice theorist is not interested in L -models per se, but rather in the SAFs that "generate" the models, and it is implicitly understood that the axioms A should describe the interesting structural properties of the decision procedures in the class K: say monotonicity, non-dictatorship, etc. . .
To bring the two perspectives together, and describe properties of the underlying SAFs in the language L , we somehow need to abstract from the contingencies induced by a particular profile π. We can do this by looking at all the models that a SAF F may generate, in the hope that this reveals something about the properties of F . The concept of "validity" provides this level of abstraction.
F ψ iff for all π in the domain of F, (F, π) ψ, and: F Ψ iff for all ψ ∈ Ψ, F ψ.
If F ψ (or F Ψ) , we say that ϕ (or Ψ) is valid with respect to (or on) F .
Validity is clearly a property of the SAF F itself and not of any particular model based on F . The idea of validity stems from the standard Kripke-style semantics for modal logic, where the same distinction is made between the truth of a formula ϕ as a property of a model, and its validity as a property of some underlying "frame" of the model (see Blackburn et al. [4] , p. 17, for a discussion of this notion). Our frames are the SAFs. SAFs behave much like modal frames, and also the notion of validity for majority logic behaves similar to the modal notion. For instance, just like in modal logic (see Blackburn et al. [4] , p. 33), uniform substitution preserves validity: if a formula ϕ is valid on a SAF F , then so is any formula that can be obtained from ϕ by uniformly replacing proposition letters by arbitrary L c -formulae. 4 More importantly, for SAFs that satisfy the monotonicity axiom, there is a link between well-studied semantics for monotonic modal logic and social aggregation functions. This connection allows us to build on a large number of other established results for modal logic.
Yet, from the social choice theorist's perspective, a key issue remains: can the language L express interesting properties of SAFs at all? As already observed in subsection 2.1, monotonicity is a property that can be expressed in the language L :
Lemma 4. A SAF F satisfies the axiom M if and only if
Proof. (⇒) Suppose F satisfies M. Suppose ϕ → ψ is a tautology and finally suppose towards a contradiction that F ϕ → ψ. This means there is a profile π such that (
Let π be a profile and χ a formula such that χ ∈ F (π). Let π be any profile such that [ 
Since χ was arbitrary, this shows F satisfies M.
Thus the rule: "from the validity of ϕ → ψ, infer ϕ → ψ" leads to a monotonicity restriction on the decision procedures. It is no coincidence that a modal logic that is closed under this inference rule is called "monotonic" (see Hansen [13] ). The validity of monotonic inference expresses something structural about the decision procedure F : Lemma 4 states that the validity of monotonic inference is thus just the thing that all the SAFs that satisfy the M axiom have in common. Indeed, formulated as an L -theory:
the monotonicity rule axiomatises the monotonic SAFs in the social choice theorist's sense, and the theory RM can be interpreted as the monotonicity axiom expressed in the language L . Thus theories in the language L express properties of SAFs. But this observation begs the more general question: what kinds of properties can be expressed in the language L ? As discussed in section 2.1, there is a more "logical" way to look at the scheme RM: it represents a form of deductive closure at the level of collective opinions, namely the preservation of tautological implications. More concretely, the scheme says that if ϕ is socially accepted and ψ follows (tautologically) from ϕ, then ψ must be socially accepted. Many theories in the language L have a similar flavour. Let us look at some other theories and axioms in the language L . The validity of
expresses the preservation of the ∧ connective at the collective level. Note that by uniform substitution, this axiom implies that ( ϕ ∧ ψ) → (ϕ ∧ ψ) for any ϕ, ψ ∈ L c . Also note that monotonicity implies the reverse implication, since (q 0 ∧ q 1 ) → q 0 and (q 0 ∧ q 1 ) → q 1 are tautologies. 5 A SAF that makes
valid is called cautious: whenever some ϕ ∈ L c is collectively accepted, ¬ϕ isn't (this follows from D by uniform substitution). A dual axiom requires that, for any ϕ ∈ L c , the decision procedure always selects either ϕ or ¬ϕ:
If the SAF F always selects ϕ or ¬ϕ, then F is called resolute. The knife-edge case of a resolute and cautious SAF gives the familiar case of a complete SAF. Axioms D and Dc together express preservation of tertium non datur. The theory:
expresses a stronger form of deductive closure than RM. In particular, it implies RM, and also the axiom D whenever the decision procedure does not make ⊥ valid. Now the contours of a more complete picture emerge. L -theories express inference rules for the logic of collective opinions. Since not all SAFs obey all inference rules, L -axioms narrow down classes of SAFs. In the rest of this article, we complete this picture and in particular answer the question: to what restrictions on SAFs do L -axioms translate, and how can these restrictions be characterised? In one way, this is a question about how the validity of L -theories shapes the structure of the underlying semantic objects, that is, the aggregation functions. We will see in the next section that the structure of (monotonic) SAFs can be modelled algebraically using "simple games", and we will prove that the L -axioms can describe (all) properties that are invariant under two straightforward transformations on this game-theoretic substratum of SAFs. The question is also one about the expressive power of L . If expressive power is low, the language talks in a very crude way about the SAFs, and the validity of axioms lead to crude restrictions on SAFs. We will argue in section 4 that L indeed suffers from crudeness, and that this provides a clue as to why so many Arrow-style impossibility results have emerged in the search for "collective rationality". This message is underscored by a number of results about the expressive power of L presented in that section.
Logic Meets Game Theory
3.1. Simple Games. Perhaps the most familiar and natural group decision procedure is majority voting. Simple games generalise the interpretation of the notion of a "majority". Certainly, if some subset A of a collective of agents N constitutes a majority of it, then any subset B of N that contains A must also be a majority. This is the basic intuition underlying simple games, already studied extensively by Von Neumann and Morgenstern [29] , Shapley [25] , and going back at least to Dedekind. It is formalised as follows. Let W ⊆ P(N ) be the collection of subsets of N that we think of as the majorities of N (or, in game theoretic parlance, the winning coalitions of N ). Then W is closed under supersets:
A simple game is a pair (N, W ), where N is a nonempty set of agents and W ⊆ P(N ) satisfies condition (1). If condition (1) fails, we obtain a more general object called a hypergraph (see Taylor and Zwicker [27] , p. 3).
There is a close relationship between monotonic SAFs and simple games, an observation that has been made by Monjardet [17] in the context of preference aggregation. Let Ω = (N, W ) be a simple game. Define:
In words, ψ ∈ F Ω (π) if there is some winning coalition A of Ω such that every agent i ∈ A accepts ψ. Clearly F Ω is a SAF satisfying M. We say that a SAF F is generated by a simple game if there is a simple game Ω such that F = F Ω . In this case we denote the In other words, there is a 1-1 correspondence between the monotonic SAFs and simple games. Simple games give us concrete and natural algebraic structures and can represent all monotonic SAFs. This has several advantages. First, simple games encompass the familiar set-theoretic structures such as families of majorities (see Guilbaud [12] ) and ultrafilters (Battau et al. [3] ) that have been recognised to be at the heart of social choice theory. Second, the use of simple games allows us to refine the first line in the truth conditions stated in definition 2:
If F is generated by a simple game, and π is a profile, we call the pair (F, π) a simple model, and appeal to the semantical clause (2) instead of its counterpart in definition 2. A third advantage stems from the game theoretic interpretation of simple games. If two simple games are similar from a game theoretic perspective, then the generated SAFs are related. This gives a way to categorise SAFs. The rest of this section discusses two ways in which simple games can be "transformed" into similar games that make this last observation more precise. 
3.2. The Rudin Keisler Ordering. The Rudin-Keisler (RK) ordering was introduced by M.E. Rudin to study ultrafilters [23] . Taylor and Zwicker [27] observe that this ordering has a natural interpretation when applied to simple games. Let N be a set of agents and let f : N → M be a surjection. The interpretation of f suggested by Taylor and Zwicker is that M is a set of groups or parties in which the agents in N who are identified by f in M vote en bloc. The idea is illustrated in figure 1 . Now, if Ω 1 = (N, W ) is a simple game, and f is a surjection from N to M , it is natural to look at the "reduced" game in which N is replaced by the set of groups M . To do so, define f * (W ) as the subset of P(M ) given by:
. Any outcome obtained in the simple game (M, f * (W )) can be obtained in Ω 1 by grouping the agents identified by f and letting them vote en bloc. More generally, we may ask which games can be constructed from Ω 1 by grouping agents. This is the idea behind the RK-ordering. The relation rk is a partial order on simple games. If Ω 0 rk Ω 1 then Ω 0 is called an RK-projection of Ω 1 . The simple game Ω 0 inherits many properties of Ω 1 (see Taylor and Zwicker, Proposition 1.4.13), and conversely, some of the game theoretic structure of Ω 0 is contained in the simple game Ω 1 . Such similarities between Ω 0 and Ω 1 imply a similarity between the SAFs F Ω 0 and F Ω 1 . In particular, the agents in N can "force" the decision procedure F Ω 1 to behave like F Ω 0 through forming groups. An immediate consequence is that RK-projection preserves the satisfiability of L -formulae.
Lemma 7.
Let Ω 0 = (M, V ) and Ω 1 = (N, W ); suppose there exists a mapping f :
The proof is by induction on the complexity of ϕ.
Dummy players. A player i is called a dummy player of the simple game (N, W ) if:
for all X ∈ P(N ), X ∈ W ⇐⇒ X ∪ {i} ∈ W.
For any given X ⊆ N , such a player has no influence at all on whether X is a winning coalition. Denote the set of all dummy players of a simple game Ω by D(Ω). We can create a new simple game from another one by adding or removing dummy players. I.e., let Ω 0 = (N, W ), and let A ∩ N = ∅, then one can obtain a game Ω 1 with the set A as dummy players (that is, A ⊆ D(Ω 1 )) by taking:
In this case, Ω 1 is called a dummy inflation of Ω 0 . Conversely, we say that Ω 0 is a dummy deflation of Ω 1 . Note that dummy deflation is an instance of RK-projection. Thus, a dummy inflation is called strict if it adds dummy players to a simple game that does not contain dummy players.
Just like RK-projection, dummy inflation preserves some structure of simple games. And we can again lift this observation to the level of simple models: dummy inflation also preserves the satisfiability of L -formulae.
Lemma 9. Let
The intuition behind this lemma is that dummy players have no influence on the social acceptance of ϕ. A formal proof is by induction on the complexity of ϕ.
Interesting Things to Say in L
In section 2 we observed that the monotony axiom for SAFs can be expressed in L . In this section, we characterise the expressive power of L more fully. We start with a proposition demonstrating how a number of familiar classes of SAFs can be axiomatised in L . Many of these classes pop up in the familiar impossibility results of social choice theory. This is no great surprise: as we have argued before, L -axioms typically express logical consistency constraints at the level of social opinions, and impossibility results are about the possibility of preserving logical consistency at this level.
We will say that a decision procedure F is rational if, for all profiles π in the domain of F , the set F (π) is a logically consistent set of formulae.
A
decision procedure is oligarchic if there is a non-empty subset M of N such that ϕ ∈ F (ϕ) if and only if S ⊆ [[ϕ]]
π . The consensus decision procedures are the oligarchic procedures with M = N . The dictatorial decision procedures are the oligarchic procedures with M = {i} for some i ∈ N . Other examples of SAFs that are less familiar are the "verum" functions 7 that take every π to the set of all propositions L c , and the "indecisive" functions that take every π to ∅. We call these last two examples the degenerate decision procedures.
Proposition 10. Let F : Π N → P(L c ) be any SAF (not necessarily monotonic).
(
1) F is indecisive if and only if F ¬ q. (2) F is verum if and only if F q. (3) F is monotonic if and only if
F (q 1 ∧ q 2 ) → ( q 1 ∧ q 2 ) if
and only if F RM . (4) F is paretian if and only if F . (5) F is cautious if and only if F D. (6) F is resolute if and only if F Dc. (7) If F is resolute and rational, then F C ∧ RM ∧ . (8) F is oligarchic if and only if F SRM ∪ D ∪ if and only if F C
∧ ( (q 1 ∧ q 2 ) → ( q 1 ∧ q 2 )) ∧ . (9) Assume F is
finitary. F is dictatorial if and only if F D ∧ Dc ∧ C ∧ ¬ ⊥. (10) Assume F is finitary. F is dictatorial if and only if F is rational and F Dc.
The proof of the proposition is in the appendix. In the proof, the stated axioms interact with the algebraic simple games semantics, and force certain algebraic properties on the sets of winning coalitions of the simple games, much like in the usual proofs of impossibility results in social choice theory. Items (7)- (10) show that demanding well-behaved properties at the level of collective decisions leads to very restrictive kinds of SAFs. In particular, item (8) reflects an impossibility result obtained by Dietrich and List [8] . Item (10) reflects their famous Arrow-like impossibility result [7] .
What do the classes mentioned in the proposition have in common that they are all L -axiomatisable? An answer to this question would give insight in how logical consistency constraints splits the universe of SAFs in classes and restrict them. It turns out that the game theoretic transformations sketched in the previous section help to answer this question. A first pass will show that they give necessary closure conditions for any L -axiomatisable class of monotonic SAFs. More formally, let K be a class of monotonic SAFs. We say K is L -definable if there exists a set of formulae S ⊆ L , such that for any monotonic SAF F , we have F ∈ K if and only if F S. The class K is closed under dummy inflation if, whenever F Ω 0 ∈ K and Ω 1 is a dummy inflation of Ω 0 , then F Ω 1 ∈ K. It is closed under RK-projection if, whenever F Ω 0 ∈ K and Ω 1 is an RK-projection of Ω 0 , then F Ω 1 ∈ K.
Proposition 11. Let K be a class of monotonic SAFs. K is L -definable only if it is closed under dummy inflation and RK-projection (and thus also under dummy deflation).
This proposition shows, for instance, that the consensus SAFs are not L -definable, since the consensus property of a SAF cannot be preserved by adding dummy players.
Now let π 1 be any profile with domain M . Let π 0 be a profile such that π 0 (i) = π 1 (f (i)). Let ϕ ∈ S. By assumption, (F Ω 0 , π 0 ) ϕ; by lemma 7, (F Ω 1 , π 1 ) ϕ. Since π 1 and ϕ were arbitrary, it follows F Ω 1 S and hence F Ω 1 ∈ K. The argument for dummy inflation follows from lemma 9 in a similar way.
The upshot of proposition 11 is that the expressive power of L is quite crude. This is particularly demonstrated by the following result:
Proposition 12. Any non-empty L -definable class of monotonic SAFs either contains all dictatorships, or contains only degenerate SAFs.
Proof. Take any F Ω 0 ∈ K such that F is neither verum or indecisive. Denoting (N, W ) := Ω 0 , we have W / ∈ {∅, P(N )}. Let M be any non-empty set and let j ∈ M . The trivial dictatorial game Ω 1 := ({j}, {{j}}) rk Ω 0 . For consider f : N → {j}. On the one hand X ∈ V implies X = {j}, and hence f
On the other hand X / ∈ V implies X = {j}, and hence f
Clearly Ω 2 is a dictatorship. From the closure conditions on K, Ω 2 ∈ K. Since M and j ∈ M were arbitrary, all dictatorships are members of K.
Proposition 12 can be interpreted as a "language dependent" impossibility theorem. It shows formally that non-dictatorship is not expressible in majority logic. But a more ambitious interpretation is the following. Proposition 10 shows that a desire for logical consistency at the level of social opinions, stacking L axioms, rapidly translates into severe restrictions on SAFs. Proposition 12 then shows that this never leads to restrictions that throw out the dictatorships. Thus, by demanding various forms of logical consistency, the best one can ever hope for is pinning down dictatorships. In fact, item (10) of proposition 12 shows that a logic of the collective that preserves the familiar behaviour of the primitive logical connectives ¬ and ∧ (i.e. contains the rule ϕ ↔ ¬ ¬ϕ and the rule (ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ ( ϕ ∧ ψ) already does exactly that. All in all, this sheds some light on why the same dictatorial results have emerged in so many contexts and domains since Arrow's original discovery.
In the remainder of this article, we move a step beyond the observation above, and prove that the closure conditions stated in proposition 11 characterise the axiomatic expressive power of L . Concretely, a class K of monotonic SAFs can be axiomatised (in the social choice theorist's sense) using majority logic if and only if it is closed with respect to the two mentioned transformations of simple games. We will need to impose the additional mild restriction that the SAFs in K are finitary. Our goal is to prove:
Theorem 13. Let K be a non-empty class of finitary SAFs. K is L -definable relative to the class of all finitary SAFs if and only if it is closed under dummy inflation and RK-projection (and thus also under dummy deflation).
Theorem 13 is the majority logic counterpart of the famous Goldblatt Thomason theorem for modal logic. It states that if a monotonic SAF satisfies some L -expressible axiom, then another monotonic SAF G will satisfy that same axiom if G can be obtained from F through the game theoretic transformations mentioned. Conversely, if G cannot be obtained from F in this manner, then there is a theory of L -formulae that distinguishes F from G. Thus the theorem establishes a concrete link between the logical strength of the language L on the one hand, and the properties of SAFs that it is able to characterise on the other hand, which is useful for social choice theorists.
The "only if" direction of theorem 13 follows directly from proposition 11. We prove the other direction in the next section, in a number of steps, by comparing majority logic more closely with modal logic. This might appear roundabout, but there are two good reasons for this approach. First, similarities between the languages allow us to draw upon some established results for modal logic. Second, we show that the basic modal language is strictly more expressive than that of majority logic, but does not gain us very much from majority logic in terms of axiomatic power. We give the closure conditions for modally definable classes of SAFs, which turn out to be quite similar to those of theorem 13. The theorem will follow as a corollary.
Majority Logic as a fragment of Modal Logic
As pointed out in section 2.1, the language L is a fragment of the basic modal language, L . We will now see that also the simple games semantics can be viewed as a fragment of the standard semantics for monotonic modal logic. Thus there is a relation between modal logic and majority logic both at the semantic and the syntactic level. But how exactly does L sit around L ? This is the question that this section will answer. In subsection 5.1, we relate the model theory of monotonic modal logic to that of majority logic. In subsection 5.2 we characterise the modally definable classes of SAFs. We combine results to deduce theorem 13.
Monotonic Modal Logic.
In monotonic modal logic formulae are interpreted using neighbourhood structures. A neighbourhood structure consists of a neighbourhood frame, and possibly a valuation function. As alluded to above, SAFs are close cousins of these frames, while valuation functions are basically the same thing as profiles.
Definition 14 (neighbourhood structures). A (monotonic) neighbourhood frame (n.f.)
is a pair (S, ν), where S is a nonempty set of states, and ν : S → P(P(S)) is the neighbourhood function; for each s ∈ S, ν(s) is a subset of P(S) satisfying the monotony condition (1). A neighbourhood model (n.m.), M = (S, ν, V ), is a n.f. paired with a valuation V : S → P(Q).
Formulae of L
are interpreted at states of neighbourhood models. The corresponding semantic relation * is defined inductively:
M, s * ⊥ never;
and:
If a formula ϕ is globally true (meaning, M, s * ϕ at all states s ∈ S of a n.m. M = (S, ν, V )), we write:
If ϕ is valid on a n.f. (true under any valuation V ), this is denoted by (S, ν) * ϕ.
The semantics of monotonic modal logic will be clear to anyone familiar with Kripke-style semantics for modal logic, with the possible exception of the modal clause (4). Observe that clause (4) is essentially the same as (2) above for the semantics of monotonic decision procedures, except that in a n.f. the set ν(s) is a simple game that depends on the state s. A simple model consisting of a monotonic SAF F and profile π can therefore be viewed as a n.m. with a constant neigbourhood function. Under this interpretation, agents become the states, and we take V (i) = π(i) and ν(i) = W F for all i ∈ N . With slight abuse of notation, we will denote the corresponding n.m. (or n.f.) simply by (F, π) (or F ), and we use for the truth conditions of both L and L . In addition, an easy induction shows that formulae of L have the distinct property that if they are true at some state (or agent) in a simple model (F, π), they are true at all states.
"Bisimulation" is the central notion of equivalence for models for modal logic. We will prove a lemma showing that for simple models that satisfy the same particular set of L -formulae, the construction of a bisimulation amounts to a simple check whether agents accept the same sentence letters. It is used in proposition 17 below. First the definition of a bisimulation.
Definition 15. Q-Restricted bisimulation. Suppose M = (S, ν, V ) and M = (S , ν V ).
Let Q ⊆ Q and let Z ⊆ S × S a nonempty relation. Z is a Q-restricted bisimulation between M and M if the following three conditions hold: (Prop). If sZs , then s and s satisfy the same sentence letters in Q; (Forth). If sZs and X ∈ ν(s), then there is X ⊆ S such that X ∈ ν (s ) and for all s ∈ X , there is s ∈ X s.t. sZs ; (Back). If sZs and X ∈ ν (s ), then there is X ⊆ S such that X ∈ ν(s) and for all s ∈ X, there is s ∈ X s.t. sZs . Z is a bisimulation if it is a Q-restricted bisimulation.
It is well known fact that if Z is a bisimulation between two models M and M and sZs , then M, s * ϕ if and only if M , s * ϕ, for all ϕ in the modal language L (and thus in L ) (see e.g. Hansen [13] , 4.10). Since this fact is proved by induction on the complexity of ϕ, it easily generalises to a Q-restricted bisimulation: if Z is a Q-restricted bisimulation between M and M and sZs , then M, s * ϕ if and only if M , s * ϕ, for all ϕ in the modal language L (and thus in the language L ) that contain no sentence letters from the set Q − Q. Now, given a finite set of sentence letters Q, consider all formulae build up from sentence letters in Q, negation, conjunction and disjunction. Up to logical equivalence there are only finitely many of such formulae, hence we may take the set Γ Q that contains all of them up to logical equivalence to be a finite set. Define Γ Q as the set:
Clearly Γ Q is also a finite set, and each ϕ ∈ Γ Q is an L -formula. Let us write M . Suppose sZs and take X ∈ ν(s). We need to prove there is X ∈ ν (s ) such that ∀x ∈ X , there is x ∈ X for which xZx holds. Now towards a contradiction suppose there is no such X . Then for every Y ∈ ν (s ), there is an y i ∈ Y such that for all x j ∈ X, it is not true that x j Zy i . This means y i and x j differ in their sentence letters, and there must be literals witnessing this; for instance: y i ¬q and x i ¬q for some q ∈ Q. Pick one and denote the literal true at y i but not at x j by ϕ ij . Let ∆ y i be the (finite) set: {ϕ i j | i = i }. By construction, for each y i we have M, y i ∆ y i . Hence:
Yet ¬ ¬ y i ∆ y i must be equivalent to a formula in Γ Q . Hence, the discrepancy between (5) and (6) contradicts our assumption that M Q ∼ M . The (Back) clause can be proved in similar fashion.
Frame Definability in L
and L . Recall that we are working towards characterising the classes of monotonic SAFs that are definable by sets of L formulae. We now give the answer in two steps. First, we characterise the L -definable classes that are also definable by a set of L formulae. Next, we characterise the modally definable classes, and deduce which classes are L -definable.
A class of monotonic SAFs K is modally definable if there exists a set of formulae S ⊆ L , such that for any monotonic SAF F , we have F ∈ K if and only if F S. Since L formulae are interpreted at states (or agents), L can be used to express additional properties of SAFs. After all, for simple models, clause (3) reads as:
This is exactly what allows us to express things in L that majority logic cannot express. For instance, it is easy to show that a SAF F is a consensus SAF if and only if F p → p. Hence consensus SAFs are modally definable by p → p; however, proposition 11 says that consensus is not definable by majority logic, since the class of consensus SAFs is not closed under adding dummy players. In fact, this is exactly the kind of game theoretic transformation that distinguishes the expressive power of languages L and L . Proposition 17. Take K a non-empty, modally definable class of monotonic SAFs. K is L -definable provided it is closed under dummy inflation.
Let Q be the set of sentence letters appearing in ϕ.
F is generated by a simple game Ω = (N , W ); now consider a dummy inflation Ω of Ω with a new agent s , and a corresponding profile π such that π (i) = π (i) for all i ∈ N , and π (s ) = π(s). By lemma 9, F , π Λ Γ Q , so that F Q ∼ F . By lemma 16 s is (Q-restricted) bisimilar to s. Hence (F Ω , π ) ¬ϕ. But ϕ ∈ S; and F Ω ∈ K since K is closed under dummy inflation; and S modally defines K-a contradiction.
Proposition 17 leaves open the question which classes are modally definable. As promised, the central result in this section provides the answer, at least for finitary SAFs. Theorem 13 follows as a corollary, since the closure conditions mentioned therein fully entail the closure conditions mentioned in the following proposition.
Proposition 18. Let K be a non-empty class of finitary SAFs. K is definable relative to the class of all finitary SAFs by a set S of L formulae if and only if it is closed under RK-projection (thus under dummy deflation), and weak dummy inflation.
Proof. (⇐). The first closure condition follows from the following observation on the relation between the model theory of majority logic and modal logic (for definitions see Hansen [13] , p. 16 and p. 33): an RK-projection of a simple game corresponds to a bounded morphic image of the corresponding n.f. Therefore, by proposition 5.31 in [13] , the validity of a modal formula is preserved by RK-projection.
We will show the same is true for weak dummy inflation. Let Ω 0 = (N, W ) be a simple game with D(Ω 0 ) = ∅. Let Ω 1 := (M, V ) be a dummy inflation of Ω 0 . We claim that for all ϕ ∈ L , F Ω 0 ϕ implies F Ω 1 ϕ. Suppose, to the contrary, that for some ϕ ∈ L , F Ω 1 ϕ while F Ω 0 ϕ. There exists a profile π 1 and an agent j ∈ M such that (F Ω 1 , π 1 ), j ϕ. It must be that j / ∈ N . Now D(Ω 0 ) is non-empty so we may pick i ∈ D(Ω 0 ); we have i ∈ D(Ω 1 ). Let π 1 be the permutation of π 1 such that π 1 (j) = π 1 (i); π 1 (i) = π 1 (j); and for all k ∈ M − {i, j}, π 1 (k) = π 1 (k). We have simply relabelled the dummy players i and j; hence we find (F Ω 1 , π 1 ) , i ϕ. Let π 0 be the restriction of π 1 to N . Recalling that Ω 0 is a dummy contraction of Ω 1 , we consider the surjection f : M → N defined by f (k) = k for all k ∈ N ; f (k) = i for all k ∈ M − N . Observe that Ω 0 is an RK-projection of Ω 1 via f . Proposition 4.5 in [13] implies that (F Ω 0 , π 0 ), i ϕ if and only if (F Ω 1 , π 1 ) , i ϕ. Thus we conclude (F Ω 0 , π 0 ), i ϕ, a contradiction.
(⇒). For the other direction, we will show that the L -theory of K, Λ K := {ϕ ∈ L | for all F ∈ K, F ϕ}, defines K, provided K satisfies the closure conditions. To this end, we need to show that if for some finitary F , F Λ K , then F ∈ K. So suppose F Λ K . Without loss of generality, we may assume that the simple game generating F , (N, W ) contains at most one dummy. For if (N, W ) contains dummy players, then its dummy contraction with just one dummy remaining also validates Λ K , and if we can show that this dummy contraction belongs to K, membership of F follows since K is closed under weak dummy inflation.
We will consider a valuation π that assigns at least one sentence letter q i to each subset of P(N ). Hence for each X ⊆ N , there is a sentence letter q i such that (F, π), s q i if and only if s ∈ X. We will denote this sentence letter by q X . Since F is finitary, we need only a finite set of sentence letters. Let Q be this set.
Let d ∈ N be the dummy of (N, W ) if it contains one, otherwise d may be chosen arbitrarily from N . Let Γ Q be defined as before, and then define the set ∆:
∆ is a finite set and we claim it is satisfiable on some simple game in K. For suppose not, then
Let F be generated by (N , W ). We claim there exists an RK-projection from (N , W ) to (N, W ). From this fact and the closure conditions on K it will follow that F ∈ K.
For i ∈ N , define ψ i to be the formula:
It is easy to check that (F, π), s ψ i if and only s = i. Let i * be an arbitrary element of N and f : N → N be defined thus:
For each i ∈ N there is exactly one state at which ψ i holds, and thus f is well defined.
To complete our argument, for y ∈ Y let ϕ y denote the formula:
Then, as f −1 [X] ⊆ W was a winning coalition:
But since X / ∈ W , and by our argument above, for i ∈ Y , j ∈ N , we have ϕ i = ψ j , clearly:
This proves our claim and completes the proof of the proposition.
We conclude the section with another corollary, the modal counterpart to proposition 12. It provides substance to our claim that the basic model language does not yield much expressive power compared to L .
Proposition 19. Take K a non-empty, modally definable class of non-degenerate monotonic

SAFs. K either contains only the consensus SAFs, or it contains all dictatorships.
Proof. Suppose K is a non-empty, modally definable class of non-degenerate monotonic SAFs, and F ∈ K is not a consensus SAF. We may assume F is non-degenerate. Hence there must be an agent i ∈ N F , such that N − {i} ∈ W F and {i} / ∈ W F . Consider the dictatorial SAF generated by Ω = ({i, j}, {{j}, {i, j}}). Let f : N → {i, j} be the surjection that maps all k ∈ N − {i} to j, and i to itself: Ω is an RK-projection of Ω F via f . Up to a relabelling of the names of the agents, every dictatorship is either a weak dummy inflation or a dummy deflation of Ω . By the closure conditions of proposition 18, they are all members of K.
Conclusion
In this article we investigated majority logic, a logical language that is able to express behavioural properties of decision procedures in terms of the "collective acceptance" of logical propositions. We introduced simple games as the natural semantics to interpret this language. Subsequently, we investigated the axiomatic expressive power of the language. We outlined how the validity of logical inference rules at the level of social opinions, as expressed by formulae in majority logic express, interacts with the semantics, forcing certain algebraic properties on these simple games. In turn, these force behavioural properties on the decision procedures represented by them. Thus the key idea has been to establish links between formulae of majority logic and implied conditions on simple games. Besides determining a number of familiar properties of simple games that can be expressed by the language, more generally, we showed that a property of a simple game can be expressed in the language if and only if the property is invariant under two kinds of transformations that have been studied by game theorists.
In addition to the link with game theory, the article has explored a link with the "frame definability" of modal logic, the study of properties that are modally definable. A slogan summarising the view taken in this article is that the axiomatisations of social choice theorists are the definability results of modal logicians. It follows that techniques used by logicians can thus be useful for social choice theorists. In particular, explicit attention to the logical language in which an axiom can be formalised yields immediate insight in its logical consequences. First, any axiom of social choice theory defines a class of social aggregation functions up to the invariance results of the logical language in which that axiom is expressible. This point is most vividly underlined by theorem 13, which gives the exact correspondence between whether a (scheme of) axiom(s) is expressible in the language of majority logic and the closure conditions on classes of SAFs that can be axiomatised by it. Second, the relation between a language that describes decision procedures and its semantics reveals how axioms impose particular constraints on SAFs. As pointed out, axioms expressible in majority logic typically impose consistency constraints on the logic of collective decision making, which severely constrain the algebraic properties of the underlying SAFs, giving rise to the many impossibility results.
While all the results in this article are "language dependent", i.e., they depend on our choice of majority logic as the vehicle for our investigation, these overarching points are not. Nevertheless, our choice of language has given rise to two limitations that further warrant discussion. First, the expressive power of majority logic is weak, too weak to fully satisfy the axiomatic interests of social choice theorists. Second, to keep the link with modal logic and simple games straightforward, this article has restricted attention mostly to decision procedures that are monotonic, systematic, and have universal domain. To conclude our discussion, we briefly indicate ways in which these limitations might be lifted in future work.
The language of majority logic has a modal flavour, and its expressive power may be improved by adding ingredients found in more expressive modal languages. For instance, hybrid modal logic [4, section 7.3] would allow us to name specific agents in the language. The use of a variety of different, indexed, operators will be helpful when social decisions on different propositions are made according to different decision procedures or to investigate links between different decision procedures. One could introduce one operator for each decision procedure of interest-this can be used to lift the systematicity constraint imposed throughout this article. Recently, progress has also been made on the model theory of non-monotonic modal logic (see in particular Hansen et al. [14] ), so that strategies similar to those in this article may be used to uncover results about non-monotonic decision procedures. In sum, the results obtained in this article may potentially be generalised and extended in various useful directions. But we will have to leave the exploration of such avenues to future work.
